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Beyond the Neoliberal Governance of Time: Syndromes and a Century at a Standstill 
Jecheol Park 
In the postcolonialist discourses on the narrative in general and the cinematic narrative in 
particular, the notion of multiple times and the notion of multi-temporal narrative have been key 
concepts for critiquing Western modern notions of time and historiography as homogeneous and 
progressive. But as the contemporary digital culture has increasingly reshaped these notions as 
those of database and database narrative, what has become of those hitherto critical concepts? 
Insofar as computer and network technologies are geared toward neoliberal governmentality, 
how can we rethink the database narrative cinema in the current context of neoliberalism? Can 
we think of any other form of cinematic time that allows us to resist the neoliberal co-optation of 
the multi-temporal narrative? In this paper, I will contend that in the age of neoliberalism the 
multi-temporal or database narrative has become a neoliberal governmental dispositif. And to 
explore the ways of resisting the neoliberal logic of the database narrative cinema, I would call 
attention to the role of the cinematic hiatus in bringing breakdowns to this logic and offering 
spectators some time for making differences and changes beyond economic measures. As a case 
study, I will carefully examine the Thai filmmaker Apichatpong Weerasethakul’s 2006 film 
Syndromes and a Century in both the context of critical and media theories, as well as the 
context of Thai political economy. In reading this film, I will specifically focus on how hiatuses 





The notion of multiple times has been a linchpin for the critiques of the modern 
conception of time as homogeneous and progressive and its concomitant conception of official 
historiography. Very early on, philosophers such as Bergson or Benjamin developed this 
alternative notion of time in the process of offering their critiques of modernity. More recently, a 
number of postcolonialist thinkers such as Homi Bhabha or Dipesh Chakravarty have focused on 
this notion to characterize the difference of non-Western subaltern or diasporic people’s 
memories and narratives from Western imperialist or non-Western neocolonialist ones. As many 
non-Western film scholars—such as Robert Stam or Hamid Naficy, to name a few—have 
pointed out, this notion has also been seen as crucial for theorizing multi-temporal narratives 
characteristic of many of the non-Western postcolonial national or diasporic films and videos. 
With the digital turn in film culture, however, the notion of multiple times and the notion 
of multi-temporal narrative began to be rethought. Lev Manovich and Marsha Kinder propose 
that the notion of database and the notion of database narrative have replaced the notion of 
multiple times and the notion of multi-temporal narrative respectively in the age of digital 
media.
1
 In this light, Kinder suggests, the multi-temporal narrative is to be characterized more 
generally by “the selection of particular data (characters, images, sounds, events) from a series of 
databases or paradigms, which are then combined to generate specific tales.”2 It should be noted 
that Manovich and Kinder highlight the user’s unprecedented degree of freedom in the process of 
selecting data from databases and combining them with one another. Clearly, the multi-temporal 
narrative cinema is still unilateral and thus is distinct from full-fledged interactive database 
narrative media, but as Kinder and more recently Allan Cameron note, the proliferation of the 
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multi-temporal narrative in the contemporary cinema indicates “the rise of the database as a 
cultural form.”3 
However, once we consider the ways in which computer and network technologies have 
served as neoliberal governmental dispositifs, this initial, if not hasty, optimism about the 
database narrative would be undercut. Although neoliberalism aims at “liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms”4, this neoliberal notion of freedom is not the same as the one related to 
natural rights as Hobbs or Locke proposed, but refers to the freedom of the subject to act and 
react “in accordance with economic incentives and disincentives.”5 Moreover, as Foucault 
observes, neoliberalism, as a flexible form of power, while allowing for a degree of laissez-faire 
at the level of an individual, is ultimately aimed at regulating a population by “achieving an 
overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers.”6 Notably, as 
Wendy Chun notes, the computer is a neoliberal governmental dispositif par excellence because 
“[c]omputers as future depends on computers as memory machines, on digital data as archives 
that are always there.”7 In other words, the entrepreneurial pro-sumers of the database narrative 
media in the age of neoliberalism tend to create their “own” narratives by selecting data from 
databases and combining them not simply randomly but in ways that are likely to garner as much 
attention as possible from the audience, and they will do so through their analyses of previously 
produced narratives.
8
 Indeed, if databases are shared by pro-sumers through computer networks, 
computer programs will do these calculative analyses fairly efficiently and precisely. In this 
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respect, it is not surprising that some of the most popular multi-temporal narrative films such as 
Groundhog Day (1993), Sliding Doors (1998), Run Lola Run (1998), or The Butterfly Effect 
(2004) have strategically used “forking path narrative” devices to highlight the themes of the 
efficient management of affective labor, woman’s entrepreneurship, the efficient management of 
time, and effective risk reduction.
9
 From this perspective, the database narrative would not so 
much serve to critique the modern notion of rationalized homogeneous time but to maintain no 
less rationalized the new order, the neoliberal world order. 
Clearly, Apichatpong’s Syndromes and a Century (hereafter Syndromes) is characterized 
by a form of multi-temporal narrative, more precisely, a forking path narrative. The film is 
divided into two parts, and approximately at the midpoint of the film the first part ends and the 
second part begins. The first half and the second half seem to repeat each other in different 
historical eras. The first half is situated in a hospital of the past and its central character is Dr. 
Toey, a female doctor, whereas the second half is developed in a hospital of the present, with 
focus on Dr. Nohng, a male doctor. Moreover, a series of characters, narrative elements and 
visual and sonic characteristics of the first half seem to repeat in the second half in glaringly 
opposite ways: rural/urban, female/male, night/day, natural/mechanical, magical/scientific, folk 
song/monotonous ambient sound, jokes and humors/debaucheries, static/mobile camera, long 
shots/close ups, etc.
10
 In an interview, Apichatpong himself acknowledged that the first half is 
about his memory of his mother and the second his father and that he “started out with larger 
dualities.”  
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Given these oppositions between the two parts, the film seems to conduct a non-Western 
critique of the hegemonic Western modern sense of time as homogeneous progressive by 
deploying multiple times. From this perspective, the film would be seen as a postcolonialist 
gesture toward redeeming subaltern people’s memories of past Thailand left behind by the drive 
of modernization toward moving forward. And yet, this standard postcolonialist reading of the 
film misses the important fact that the film was produced in the neoliberal era of Thailand.  
As many other East and Southeast Asian nations such as South Korea or Indonesia, 
Thailand suffered from a financial crisis in 1997 and had to implement neoliberal polices as the 
IMF recommended in exchange for its rescue package. For the first four years after the crisis, 
Thai government prioritized huge corporations in the metropolitan areas over small businesses in 
the rural areas, which led to an escalating wealth gap between rich and poor. But from 2001 on, 
the Prime Minister Thaksin began to implement a set of populist reforms (later dubbed as 
“Thaksinomics”), including a debt forgiveness program for farmers, low-interest loans for rural 
small businesses, and the “One Tambon (village) One Product” program, which is geared toward 
promoting rural entrepreneurship.
11
 These polices were clearly welcomed by Thai rural 
populations, especially ones from the Northeastern area called issan while at the same time they 
provoked intense oppositions from the middle and high class populations. In 2006, however, 
with the military coup, Thai political economy went back to the pre-2001 neoliberal condition, 
and it lasted five years until Yingluck (Thaksin’s youngest sister) became the Prime Minister in 
2011 and continued Thaksinomics. 
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It is clear from this account that the 2006 film Syndromes appeared after Thai people 
experienced neoliberalism for almost a decade. And this indicates the necessity of reading this 
film in the context of Thai neoliberalism rather than the previous Thai military regimes. The film, 
then, will be read as a database narrative film the two narrative layers of which would allegorize 
the two options between which the nation of Thailand has to choose for its direction of 
neoliberalism. To put it another way, the film will be seen to ask Thai audiences to compare and 
choose between two forking paths leading to neoliberalism, the one aimed at promoting rural 
entrepreneurship and the other aimed at prioritizing metropolitan corporations. Also, given that it 
apparently treats both parts equally, the film seems to maintain neutrality about this choice, 
leaving it entirely up to Thai entrepreneurial audiences’ calculations for decision.12 
Despite its database narrative features, however, Syndromes also involves a different 
form of temporality which can counter neoliberal entrepreneurial rationality that characterizes 
the database narrative. Across both parts, various forms of hiatuses very often unpredictably 
appear to momentarily arrest and derail the selection and combination processes of the database 
narrative, thus leading neoliberal rationality to breakdowns at least momentarily. As the 2008 
global financial crisis revealed, the overall equilibrium that neoliberal governmentality is aimed 
at achieving is, far from being guaranteed, is potentially vulnerable to its unpredictable errors. 
Foucault already made this observation, writing “[G]overnments can be mistaken. And the 
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greatest evil of government [. . .] is not that the prince is wicked, but that he is ignorant.”13 Also 
and in a way more relevant to the context of this paper, Deleuze makes it clear how the 
breakdowns of neoliberal governmentality or, in his words, a control society can be ascribed to 
the errors inherent in computer or network technologies. He writes, “[T]he passive danger is 
noise and the active, piracy and viral contamination.”14 This remark calls our attention to how 
the database narrative, which is fully actualized by computer and network technologies, is 
constantly haunted by its fatal errors or resistances to it. 
 Though it is crucial, the temporal power of the hiatus to bring these breakdowns to the 
database narrative has been less highlighted among critical discussions of time than the more 
popularized notion of multiple times. Recently, a series of scholars such as Raymond Bellour or 
Laura Mulvey have turned to this mode of time in their interest in the aspects of stillness or delay 
of cinematic or post-cinematic media.
15
 But focusing on the opposition between stillness and 
movement, or slow-paced and fast-paced, their discussions on this aberrant form of time are 
limited to continuing the previous critiques of the modern notion of time and history as 
homogeneous and progressive. In this respect, these discussions have not yet addressed the 
question of how cinematic or post-cinematic stillness or delay relates to the multi-temporal 
narrative or the database narrative. 
This neglect of the relationship between hiatuses and multiple times has something to do 
with the prevalent neglect of Deleuze’s theory of the third synthesis of time and its influence on 
his theory of the time-image. In understanding Deleuze’s concept of time-image, there has been a 
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prevalent tendency to read this concept only in terms of multiple times, the concept of which 
comes from Bergson’s Matter and Memory. It should be noted, however, that the time-image as 
multiple times or what he calls the order of time is only one type of the time-image and that 
Deleuze also discusses another important type of the time-image, which he calls the series of 
time. In Cinema 2 he writes about this type of the time-image, “[The time-image as series of time] 
brings together the before and the after in a becoming, instead of separating them; its paradox is 
to introduce an enduring interval in the moment itself.”16 Although in Cinema 2 he briefly 
mentions the difference between the two types of the time-images, Deleuze does not go into the 
details about the precise relationship between the two. However, this relationship can be found in 
his theory of the three syntheses of time, which was written in his earlier work, Difference and 
Repetition. To summarize this theory briefly, the first synthesis of time refers to the way that 
habit or the living present synthesizes the differences between times, the second one refers to the 
way that memory or the pure past synthesizes temporal differences, the third one refers to the 
way that becoming or the future synthesizes temporal differences. It is also clear from this 
account how his notions of movement- and time-image can be seen as a cinematic translation of 
this theory. Thus, the movement-image, the time-image as multiple coexisting times, and the 
time-image as series of time correspond to the first, the second, and the third synthesis of time 
respectively. 
If we restrict our focus to the relationship between the second and the third synthesis of 
time or between those two types of time-image, it should be clear how the concept of the second 
synthesis of time or coexisting multiple times, though heterogeneous in relation to linear 
progressive time, still involves a certain degree of homogeneity or commensurability and how 
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the concept of the third synthesis of time or time for becoming, by disjointing and ungrounding 
time once again, allows for opening up time for immeasurable change or for making an 
incommensurable difference. In other words, for Deleuze, in as much as multiple temporal layers 
“always play out the same thing, the same story, but at different levels,”17 they “subordinate 
[time] to the Same and the Similar.”18 On the contrary, insofar as it delinks multiple temporal 
layers in ways that make it impossible to find a common measure among them, time for 
becoming or time as series can release and redeem the power of time from the restrains of 
multiple times. 
While he highlights the role of the interval in the time-image as series of time, Deleuze 
focuses more on how this type of time-image can create a connection between images 
characterized by incommensurability or dissonance than what the interval or hiatus itself brings 
to our temporal experience of cinema. In other words, his point about the distinction between the 
two types of time-image lies in distinguishing between two ways of connecting images or 
connecting image and sound, in his words, between rational cut and irrational cut.  
However, given that contemporary cinema and media, especially contemporary art or 
experimental cinema and media, have a strong tendency to foreground slow paced images, it 
should now be important to call attention to the power of the hiatus itself, apart from its role in 
connecting images. Agamben’s theorization of cinematic image in terms of the Benjaminian 
dialectical image is, then, useful for this purpose. Here, he draws our attention to this experience 
of the hiatus (“the now-time”) along with multiple possibilities of experiencing the past (“what 
has been”). He argues that the two processes of repetition and stoppage are at work in the notion 
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of the dialectical image. Here, repetition is almost synonymous with the Deleuzian second 
synthesis of time, whereas stoppage refers to the experience of an interval or hiatus itself. 
Comparing the process of stoppage to the poetic technique of the caesura, he claims that what is 
crucial about stoppage is “a prolonged hesitation between image and meaning”—that is, a power 
that “pulls [the image] away from the narrative power to exhibit as such.”19 
If we are more careful about our temporal experience of Syndromes, it should now be 
clear how the film cannot be simply reduced to the sum of the two possible narrative sequences 
that stem from two ways of selecting data from a database and then combining them into a 
narrative sequence. This is because apart from the selected data, spectators may also encounter a 
number of hiatuses which like stumbling blocks bring the data selection and combination 
processes to a halt. Insofar as these hiatuses form a significant part of the temporal experience of 
this film, it would be impossible to ignore them as irrelevant to the selected significant data and 
the narrative sequences made out of these data. 
In the first half, we mainly see hiatuses in the form of the unexpected intrusions of 
various elements into the narrative sequences. These intrusive elements include narratively 
irrelevant shots of great length, characters’ sudden appearances or disappearances, jokes or 
humors, music, and so on. Following the logic of the database narrative, one might argue that 
these intrusions are caused by selecting less probable data from the database. But there are two 
reasons that we cannot rationalize these intrusions in this way. First, the appearances of these 
elements are often beyond prediction as can be seen, for instance, in the sudden appearance of a 
debtor of Dr Toey’s in the middle of her medical consultation with patients. It thus appears 
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almost as if these intrusive elements appear without their proper places. Second, these intrusive 
elements are in no way autonomous in relation to the neighboring elements preceding and 
following them, but seem to allow for unpredictable connections between what comes before and 
after these elements. The sudden appearance of a piece of folk music is a good example. This 
music comes in the middle of Dr. Toey’s flashback as if it were a non-diegetic background music. 
But while this music continues, instead of going back to Dr. Toey’s present, the film 
unexpectedly arrives at the scene where Dr. Ple, the dentist, sings a song. In this respect, 
spectators experience theses intrusions as time for becoming, unimaginable metamorphosis, or 
unpredictable flight. 
But what about the second half? At first sight, the narrative of the second half has few or 
no hiatuses but seem to move forward somewhat monotonously. However, even though there 
may be few or no salient hiatuses that serve as time for unpredictable metamorphoses, I would 
argue, hiatuses are also found throughout the second half in the less notable but equally 
significant forms of undecidable subtle quotidian gestures and sometimes in the cinematic forms 
of mobile shots or stills. Consider, for instance, a series of close-up and medium shots of Dr. 
Nohng’s almost expressionless faces. Overall, it is very hard to determine what emotional states 
his faces express because changes in his facial expression are so subtle that spectators may 
constantly waver over whether he feels happy, sad, depressed, or just tired. In this regard, we can 
say that hiatuses reside in his subtly changing facial expressions as they provide spectators time 
for becoming, although this becoming is very subtle as compared to that in the first half. That his 
facial expressions involve subtle but constant modifications is an indication that they allow 
spectators to experience time for subtle transformations or metamorphoses. It should, then, be 
noted that the second half to some extent reminds us of Antonioni’s films in that for both time 
12 
 
for becoming is embodied by daily attitudes of bodies. Regarding the cinema of daily attitudes of 
bodies such as the work of Antonioni, Deleuze writes, “The body is never in the present, it 
contains the before and the after, tiredness and waiting.”20 This remark is also useful for 
understanding the ways Dr. Nohng’s faces work. Like the unstable wavering of Antonioni’s film 
characters’ attitudes between tiredness and waiting, even the smallest changes in Dr. Nohng’s 
faces are enough to bring a significant change between his emotional states. 
From this reading of the film, it should now be clear how it will be a mistake if we simply 
oppose the first and the second half in a way that sees the first half as resisting the neoliberal 
database logic and the second half as endorsing it. No matter how subtle they may be, the second 
half often comes to a halt by the appearances of hiatuses. In short, given the temporal power of 
these hiatuses that traverse the entire film, Syndromes cannot simply be read as a database or 
multi-temporal narrative film, but it can also be seen to arrest the rational operations of the 
database or multi-temporal narrative and thereby to allow some time for becoming to return in 
the form of cinematic caesura. Also, insofar as neoliberal entrepreneurial rationality underlies the 
database or multi-temporal narrative, the temporal power of hiatuses in this film allows its 
spectators to challenge and resist this rationality by offering them some time for becoming, for 
irrational change beyond neoliberal governmentality. In this regard, for Thai people who 
currently live in the age of neoliberal capitalism, the film does not simply give them a chance to 
choose between two forms of neoliberal entrepreneurship, between the rural and the metropolitan 
one, but, more importantly, encourages them to imagine their future beyond the two neoliberal 
ways of governing time, that is, beyond economic measures. 
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